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New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Fix: A Solution or the
Creation of an Even Greater First Amendment Problem?
I. INTRODUCTION
Tyler Clementi is a name that rings familiar in the ears of New
Jersey citizens.1 His was a tragic story of the results of bullying, and
legislators throughout the country have considered the events, which
were followed by public outcry, and have sought to solve the bullying
problem once and for all. Clementi was a freshman student and an
accomplished violinist at Rutgers University who was reported to have
jumped off the George Washington Bridge following a cyberattack by
his roommate.2 A few nights before the suicide, his roommate had posted
on Twitter: “Roommate asked for the room till midnight. I went into
molly’s room and turned on my webcam. I saw him making out with a
dude. Yay.”3 Similar stories of victimization and bullying scatter the
media,4 and states are quickly amending current statutes and enacting
new statutes to make anti-bullying laws in their education systems more
severe.5 Following suit, the state of New Jersey enacted what
commentators have called the “toughest legislation against bullying in

1. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30 suicide.html.
2. Although the majority of anti-bullying legislation is geared toward schools ages K–12,
bullying incidents in universities have also helped spark legislative action.
3. Foderaro, supra note 1.
4. See John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech, 59
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 86 (2011) (Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl in Missouri, committed
suicide because of MySpace postings which said “she was a bad person whom everyone hated and
the world would be better off without.”); Jason A. Wallace, Bullycide in American Schools: Forging
a Comprehensive Legislative Solution, 86 IND. L.J. 735, 735 (2011) (Eric Mohat, a seventeen-yearold Ohio student, shot himself after “a bully said . . . in front of other students, ‘Why don’t you go
home and shoot yourself? No one would miss you.’”); Emily Bazelon, What Really Happened to
Phoebe
Prince,
SLATE
(July
20,
2010),
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/bulle/features/2011/what_really_happened_to_phoebe_prince/the_
untold_story_of_her_suicide_and_the_role_of_the_kids_who_have_been_criminally_charged_for_it
.html (explaining the complications surrounding the bully-related suicide of Phoebe Prince, a fifteenyear-old ninth grader who came to Massachusetts from Ireland and killed herself following the
supposed bullying from six students); Kevin & Marilyn Ryan, Phoebe’s Legacy, THE PILOT (Bos.),
June 4, 2010, at 13.
5. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 2012), www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_ Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf (last
updated July 2012); BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/.
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the nation.”6
Enacted September 1, 2011, New Jersey legislators have titled the
legislation the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights.7 Included in this legislation
is the requirement that schools adopt “comprehensive anti-bullying
policies,” which include significantly increased staff training on how to
deal with and educate against suicide and bullying, heightened deadlines
for when and how to report bullying incidents to appointed school- and
district-wide anti-bullying specialists, and even mandatory grade
postings on every school and district website that gives the bully-ranking
of that school or district.8 According to the statute, New Jersey
legislators wished to “strengthen the standards and procedures for
preventing, reporting, investigating, and responding to incidents of
harassment, intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school
and off school premises.”9 Ergo, this legislation not only allows, but also
encourages students, staff, and teachers to monitor and report incidents
of all bullying or victimization—even incidents that occur off campus.
Accordingly, the statute’s definition of “harassment, intimidation or
bullying,” includes behavior that takes place “on school property, at any
school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school grounds.”10
While many have applauded the law’s strict requirements as a model
for all other states to follow in cracking down on bullies,11 not everyone
believes that it is a change for the better, and some critics consider the
statute to be too sweeping and broad.12 For example, Richard G. Bozza,

6. Winnie Hu, Bullying Law Puts New Jersey Schools on Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/nyregion/bullying-law-puts-new-jersey-schools-onspot.html?pagewanted=all; see also New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Law Takes Effect As Students Return
to School, CBS N.Y. (Sep. 6, 2011), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/09 /06/new-jerseys-antibullying-law-takes-effect-as-students-return-to-school/.
7. Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, Ch. 122, 2010 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. (Jan. 5, 2011 West)
(codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1 to :37-30 (West 2011)).
8. Hu, supra note 6.
9. Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, Ch. 122 (2)(f) (emphasis added).
10. Id. 122(11)(2).
11. Adam Cohen, Why New Jersey’s Antibullying Law Should Be a Model for Other States,
TIME (Sept. 6, 2011) http://ideas.time.com/2011/09/06/why-new-jerseys-antibullying-law-should-bea-model-for-other-states/ (explaining that the New Jersey law is an “important step forward in
combating the bullying of young people”). See, e.g., Matt Friedman, Gov. Christie Signs ‘AntiBullying
Bill
of
Rights’,
NJ.COM
(Jan.
6,
2011),
http://www.nj.com/news/
index.ssf/2011/01/gov_christie_signs_anti-bullyi.html (“The bill sailed through the Assembly and
Senate in November. It passed 73-1, with 5 abstentions, in the Assembly. It passed the Senate 300.”).
12. See Emily Bazelon, Anti-Bullying Laws Get Tough with Schools (NPR radio broadcast
Sept. 17, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/09/17/140557573/anti-bullying-laws-get-
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the executive director of the New Jersey Association of School
Administrators, expressed concern with the statute, stating, “I think this
has gone well overboard. . . . Now we have to police the community 24
hours a day. Where are the people and the resources to do this?”13
Is New Jersey’s law the future of our country’s anti-bully reform? Is
this truly a model statute for all states to follow, as critics have
suggested, or would it be better to invalidate this law while it is still
new? This Comment analyzes New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights
under the First Amendment and argues that the biggest problem with the
new law is not just its costs or heightened liability for New Jersey
schools, but rather the statute’s increased regulation of off-campus
speech. Although many states have made a push to extend anti-bullying
legislation into the realm of cyber-space,14 New Jersey should not have
joined the bandwagon so heartily and enacted legislation that has gone so
far in chilling significant amounts of student speech on and off campus.
Part II of this Comment will address the problem and the effects of
bullying and suggest why the media’s reports on bullying may have a
greater role than we realize in the bullying problem. Part III will give an
overview of the relevant case law that governs student speech today and
explain why lower courts across the country have been unable to find a
clear standard to follow in this area. It will also discuss how the lack of
clear direction from these cases creates the potentially statuteinvalidating issues of vagueness and overbreadth. Part IV will compare
other states’ approaches to the bullying and cyberbullying problem with
New Jersey’s approach in its new law, and discuss which, if any, is the
best strategy. Finally, Part V will propose how New Jersey and other
states can tailor their laws to avoid constitutional concerns and still
effectively combat the problem of bullying by taking an ex-ante rather
than an ex-post approach.

tough-with-schools. But see Alexandra Rice, N.J. Schools Brace for Anti-Bullying Rules’ Impact,
EDUC. WK. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011 /09/14/ 03bully.h31.html
(stating that some administrators are concerned about the costs of the new legislation and the
possibility of over-policing students); Hu, supra note 6 (stating that administrators are worried about
the schools’ increased liability with the new law).
13. Hu, supra note 6.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(2)(c) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4(a) (2010); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-917A(2) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256(a)(2) (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
525.080(1)(C) (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
121A.0695 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(2)(b) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6(A)
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.285(2) (2010).
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II. BULLYING: AN INCREASING PROBLEM?
Bullying is an age-old problem, which seems so common that it does
not even need to be defined. It occurs in every classic tale, from
Shakespeare to Golding. The saying “kids will be kids” commonly
accompanies stories of bullying and harassment in school; but this view
of bullying is much too oversimplified, considering many of today’s
sobering statistics. According to recent studies, one in five students are
bullied each year, and those numbers increase to nine in ten for gay and
lesbian students.15 Bullied students are five times more likely to be
depressed than those who go to school unscathed, and 160,000 bullied
students skip school every day out of fear of their oppressors. 16 Further,
in another dimension to the problem, recent studies reveal a strong link
between school safety and academic success.17 These statistics show that
millions of students suffer from bullying victimization, which creates an
unsafe school environment and leads them to “perform poorly, skip
classes, or drop out entirely.”18
The Internet has exacerbated the bullying problem; statistics show
that forty-three percent of ten- to eighteen-year-olds report being victims
of cyberbullying.19 But many kids in this group fail to report or take
action against these incidents20 because they are afraid to have their
Internet privileges revoked or they feel their parents or adults at school
15. Jessica Bennett, From Lockers to Lockup, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/04/phoebe-prince-should-bullying-be-acrime.html.
16. Id. See also Joel Baum, Gender, Safety and Schools: Taking the Road Less Traveled, 15
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 167, 168–69 (2011) (stating that twenty-three percent of California
students reported being harassed because they were not “as masculine as other guys” or “as feminine
as other girls,” and almost half of all transgender students reported skipping a class at least once in
the past month and missing school because they felt uncomfortable or unsafe); OLWEUS BULLYING
PREVENTION PROGRAM, http:// www.violencepreventionworks.org/public/bullying_effects.page (last
visited Sept. 22, 2012) (stating that students who are bullied are more likely to experience
depression, low self-esteem, health problems, poor grades, and suicidal thoughts; and students who
bully others are more likely to get into frequent fights, steal and vandalize property, drink alcohol
and smoke, report poor grades, perceive a negative climate at school, and carry a weapon).
17. Wallace, supra note 4, at 736.
18. Id.
19. Bethan Noonan, Crafting Legislation to Prevent Cyberbullying: The Use of Education,
Reporting, and Threshold Requirements, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 330, 335 (2011)
(stating also that four to twenty-one percent of ten- to eighteen-year-olds are perpetrators of
cyberbullying).
20. Id. at 336. Cyberbullying includes e-mail, instant messaging text or pictures, and posts on
social networking sites, web pages, and blogs. The most common forms of cyberbullying are
cyberstalking, harassment, denigration, flaming, impersonation, and outing. Id. at 333.
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cannot help them.21 Cyberbullying victims suffer socially and
emotionally, as they are less able to make and keep friends and usually
exhibit signs of distress, depression, anxiety, and increased thoughts of
suicide.22
Dr. Dan Olweus, a leading research professor of psychology who is
considered the pioneer of bullying research, defines bullying as including
three important components: (1) “[b]ullying is aggressive behavior that
involves unwanted, negative actions”; (2) “[b]ullying involves a pattern
of behavior repeated over time”; and (3) “[b]ullying involves an
imbalance of power or strength.”23 Dr. Olweus explains that bullying can
take on many forms: verbal bullying, bullying through social exclusion
or isolation, physical bullying, bullying through lies and false rumors,
having money or other things taken or damaged by other students, being
threatened or being forced to do things by students who bully, racial
bullying, sexual bullying, and cyberbullying.24 Bullying can also
negatively affect more than just those directly involved. Those who
observe bullying may feel they are in an unsafe environment and may
feel fearful, powerless to act, guilty for not acting, or tempted to
participate.25 Similarly, schools with bullying issues may develop an
environment of fear and disrespect, and may see increases in the number
of students who have difficulty learning, who feel insecure, who dislike
school, or who perceive that teachers and staff have little control and do
not care about them.26
The current bullying statistics are frightening, and bullying can have
devastating results. But social scientists report that the bullying problem
is “not more extreme, nor more prevalent, than it was a half-century
ago.”27 Experts even suggest that the bullying problem has improved
over the past decade.28 Further, although cyberbullying presents new
kinds of challenges, this type of bullying still occurs a third less than
traditional bullying.29 But with every reported suicide or bullying
21. Id. at 336.
22. Id. at 337.
23. OLWEUS, Resisting Bullying, supra note 16 (“A person is bullied when he or she is
exposed, repeatedly and over time, to negative actions on the part of one or more other persons, and
he or she has difficulty defending himself or herself.”).
24. Id.
25. OLWEUS, Bullying Effects, supra note 16.
26. Id.
27. Bennett, supra note 15.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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statistic, society becomes more aware of the bullying problem and more
inclined to want a drastic change. It is clear that something must be done,
and state legislatures have been answering the call by enacting antibullying statutes and increasingly intensifying those statutes’ severity
and breadth.30
By contrast, however, some critics argue that the intensity of today’s
legislation, specifically New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, is not
a necessary solution because it aims to solve a bullying problem that is
bigger than what actually exists. Society’s reaction to bullying is what
has changed over time, and such a change is not necessarily a positive
thing as illustrated by “the helicopter parents who want to protect their
kids from every stick and stone, the cable-news commentators who whip
them into a frenzy, the insta-vigilantism of the Internet.”31 In fact, the
media may have skewed our perception of this problem:
[B]ullying is not just a social ill; it’s a “cottage industry” . . . complete
with commentators and prevention experts and a new breed of legal
scholars, all preparing to take on an enemy that’s always been there.
None of this is to say that bullying is not a serious problem (it is), or
that tackling it is not important. But like a stereo with the volume
turned too high, all the noise distorts the facts, making it nearly
impossible to judge when a case is somehow criminal, or merely
cruel.32

As Yamada suggests, bullying is a problem worth fighting; but
fighting the problem is not something that should be taken to the
extreme. Legislation is an important step in curtailing bullying in
schools. But in deciding which legislation has gone too far, it is
important to understand the truth of the statistics, the impact of the
media, and the solutions that are already in place.33
III. CASE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW JERSEY’S LAW
One particularly problematic aspect of anti-bullying legislation is its
infringement upon students’ constitutionally protected First Amendment
freedoms of speech. Under the First Amendment there are only a few

30. See supra note 14.
31. Bennett, supra note 15.
32. Id.
33. See infra Part IV (detailing different approaches that states can take, and already have
taken, to avoid over-legislation in the anti-bullying arena).
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exceptions to the large body of protected speech34: obscenity,35
defamation,36 public safety,37 incitement to riot,38 and the so-called
“fighting words,”39 to name a few. “The rationale usually given for
unprotected speech is that it contains no ideas or viewpoints and does not
advance any socially worthwhile goal.”40 But there is another established
category of speech—speech that is within the school setting—that is
unprotected in some circumstances, not because the speech does not
advance any socially worthwhile goals, but because it is imperative for
schools to be able to regulate speech on their campuses. The four
Supreme Court cases that address students’ First Amendment rights are
considered rather canonical: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,41 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,42
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,43 and Morse v. Frederick.44
Although these four cases are continually regarded as binding
precedent and are cited by most lower courts in free-speech cases within
a school setting, the cases do not decipher many of the complexities of
student speech within the First Amendment context. Rather, these cases
are at most a good framework for First Amendment analysis, as they fail
to clearly define exactly when and how to apply their rules. The
deficiencies in these cases, which mainly come from a lack of clear
direction, have been the basis for much confusion in the lower courts,
“particularly when the speech involves the Internet or other new
media,”45 or when it extends off campus. This section will discuss each
of the four cases and explain why each fails to provide appropriate
direction for legislators wanting to make anti-bullying laws that are
consistent with judicial precedent.

34. Hayward, supra note 4, at 102.
35. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
36. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
38. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
40. Hayward, supra note 4, at 102.
41. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
42. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
43. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
44. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
45. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63
FLA. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) (citing several different lower court cases that have had very similar
facts but different outcomes).
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A. Tinker and the Birth of the “Substantial Disruption” Doctrine
In Tinker, students sued their school district seeking an injunction
and nominal damages after school officials suspended them for wearing
black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.46 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, which
upheld the school authorities’ actions on the ground that the armband
prohibition was reasonable to prevent the disturbance of school
discipline.47 But the Supreme Court reversed and held that the students’
conduct was not disruptive and therefore was considered “pure speech,”
entitled to full First Amendment protection.48 The Court articulated that
it would be absurd to assume that students or teachers “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate”49 and held that the state’s interest in eliminating
disturbances in schools is “not enough to overcome the right to freedom
of expression.”50 The Court emphasized that schools could not justify
restricting otherwise protected student speech for only an
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance”51 or “a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”52
The Court did recognize, however, the necessity of some limitations
on student speech and held that student speech may be prohibited when it
“materially and substantially interfer[es] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,”53 or if it “collid[es]
with the rights of others.”54 Accordingly, the Court protected the
student’s speech in this case because there was no substantial disruption
from a student passively wearing a symbolic armband.
Although the Court’s failure to define substantial disruption or
interference here did not alter the outcome of this particular case,
because the conduct involved was clearly not a substantial disruption,55

46. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
47. Id. at 505.
48. Id. at 505–06.
49. Id. at 506.
50. Id. at 508.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 509.
53. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
55. Hayward, supra note 4, at 103 (“[W]hen wearing armbands the petitioners were quiet and
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the absence of a definition of the commonly quoted phrase “substantial
disruption” causes significant problems in many student speech cases
today. This substantial-disruption doctrine is the “most widely used
standard applied at the lower-court level to online student speech”56 and
is the most commonly used phrase in state anti-bullying statutes; but the
phrase has never been defined in a way to avoid discretionary legislation
and court rulings. Moreover, without clear parameters, the popularly
cited doctrine is potentially facially overbroad and void for vagueness,
which is seen even more easily when applied to off-campus student
speech.57
B. Fraser’s Classification of the Lewd and Obscene
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test has become the “hallmark of
student speech cases because of its application to student speech inside
and outside of school”;58 but the Court has also established three
separate rules, which further articulate the parameters of student speech.
In Fraser, a student gave a speech at a school election assembly, which
all the students of the school were required to attend. During his speech,
the student used “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual” language59 and,
as a result, was suspended for violating a school disciplinary rule that
prohibited “conduct which materially and substantially interfere[d] with
the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures.”60 Although both the district court and the court of
appeals found the student’s speech constitutionally protected according
to the Tinker precedent, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court
acknowledged Tinker in its decision by affirming that students retain
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression even in a
school setting; but the Court expressed the need to balance this freedom
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in school with “the

passive. They were not disruptive, and did not impinge upon the rights of others.”).
56. Noonan, supra note 19, at 339.
57. See Goldman, supra note 45, at 405 (stating that while most lower courts have “applied
the ‘substantial disruption’ standard to off-campus speech and find such speech unprotected when it
reasonably may cause substantial disruption at the school,” these lower court decisions fail to
identify how a court should determine what constitutes a “‘substantial disruption’ beyond almost
meaningless general statements”).
58. Noonan, supra note 19, at 341.
59. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986).
60. Id. at 678.
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boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”61 The Court did not
overturn Tinker, but established a new rule that identified lewd and
offensive student speech as constitutionally unprotected. Thus, this rule
demonstrated that “the constitutional rights of students in public schools
are not co-extensive with those of non-students in other settings, and
[that] Tinker’s mode of analysis was not the sole analytical approach in
school speech cases.”62
The Fraser rule gives even less insight than does the Tinker rule in
suggesting how courts should approach student speech cases, especially
those dealing with off-campus speech. Even so, a comparison of the two
cases demonstrates that pure political speech (like that in Tinker) is more
likely to be protected than other types of speech, and that vulgar and
obscene speech (like that in Fraser) will be unprotected. Although
bullying does not completely fit within either of these categories, the
significantly low value of speech and expression of bullying seems to
make it more akin to the low-level of speech in Fraser. There is no
indicator that the rule in Fraser permeates, in any way, the realm of offcampus speech. However, the speech in Fraser is similar enough or akin
to the constitutionally unprotected category of obscenity, which can be
prohibited off campus in ways other than school regulations. Therefore,
because the speech in Fraser can be regulated by other means, there is no
real need for the Fraser rule to extend off campus. By contrast, however,
bullying in the majority of cases does not fit within a category of
unprotected speech, like obscenity,63 so the Supreme Court should give
more specific direction on how to apply its rules to the difficult
cyberbullying contexts, while still maintaining students’ First
Amendment rights.
C. Hazelwood
In Hazelwood, students brought suit in federal district court alleging
that their First Amendment rights were violated when the school deleted
two pages from a student newspaper, which included one article about
students’ experiences dealing with pregnancy and another article about
the impact of divorce on students.64 The newspaper had been written and

61. Id. at 681.
62. Goldman, supra note 45, at 402.
63. See infra Part V (suggesting that perhaps bullying could fit within the categories of
fighting words or true threats).
64. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988).
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edited as part of a class, but the principal was worried because the
content indirectly identified several students and directly identified a
student’s father.65 At the time the supervising teacher submitted page
proofs of the newspaper, the principal believed that there was not enough
time for the students to make necessary changes before printing, so he
deleted the pages.66 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s
decision that a First Amendment violation had occurred, finding that the
school had acted within its authority in regulating the newspaper’s
content.67
In its decision, the Court articulated three major points. First, the
First Amendment rights of students in public schools “are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”68
and those rights must be “applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment.”69 Therefore, “[a] school need not tolerate
student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’
even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the
school.”70 Second, the school newspaper at issue could not be
characterized as a forum for public expression; therefore, the school
could impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers,
and other members of the school community.71 And third, the standard
for determining when a school may punish student expression that
happens to occur on school premises is not “the standard for determining
when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the
dissemination of student expression.”72
The Hazelwood rules, as articulated by the Court, discuss another
layer of analysis, beyond the two prior cases, for understanding students’
First Amendment rights. However, these rules do not provide complete
direction for anti-bullying legislation specifically. Schools can apply the
first Hazelwood rule and prohibit bullying on campus on the basis that
bullying is not consistent with “the special characteristics of the school
65. Id. at 262–63.
66. Id. at 263–64.
67. Id. at 276.
68. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
71. Id. at 267–69 (explaining that the only way to create a public forum is by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse).
72. Id. at 272–73.
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environment”; but this rule does not provide specific guidance for offcampus regulation. Schools can also apply the second and third
Hazelwood rules to prohibit bullying that may occur in any school
medium (e.g., a school newspaper or a school website); but neither rule
offers direction for private mediums. By contrast, the Court’s holding
suggests that public forums (e.g., email, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) should
be open for all student speech regardless of harmful content; therefore,
the second and third Hazelwood rules are not intended to apply to offcampus speech.
D. Morse
Finally, in Morse, the most recent case dealing with the First
Amendment rights of student speech, the Court followed its trend of
giving schools even more regulatory power.73 Here, the Court rejected a
student’s claim that his conduct, unfurling a banner that stated “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS,” was protected under the First Amendment.74 The
student had displayed the banner off campus at a school-sanctioned and
school-supervised event, and the principal—who considered the banner
as promoting illegal drug use in violation of school policy—had
confiscated the banner and suspended the student when he refused to
take it down.75 While the district court held that there was no First
Amendment infringement, the Ninth Circuit held that even though the
banner promoted drug use and occurred during a school-authorized
event, the student’s speech was protected because his speech did not
constitute a substantial disruption.76
However, the Supreme Court in this case reversed the appellate
court’s decision and held that the prohibition did not violate the First
Amendment because schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted
to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging
illegal drug use,77 and because the speech was considered on-campus.78
To support this holding, the Court stated that the nature of students’
rights depends on “what is appropriate for children in school,”79 a
73. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 393 (2007).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 397–98.
76. Id. at 399.
77. Id. at 408.
78. Id. at 400–01.
79. Id. at 394 (quoting Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–656 (1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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standard that in this case includes the “important—indeed, perhaps
compelling” interest in deterring drug use by school children.80 Because
drug abuse is a serious national problem and because Congress has
declared that it is part of a school’s job to educate against such abuse,
both “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school environment,’ and the
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse allows schools to
restrict student expression” that encourages such use.81 The Court also
articulated that the speech could be regulated because it was “school
speech”: the event had occurred during normal school hours and had
been sanctioned by the principal as an approved social event where
school rules would apply.82
Although factually different from bullying, this case provides a bit
more direction for anti-bullying legislation than earlier Supreme Court
precedent. First, Morse defines, though in a limited way, what can be
regulated in schools. The Court articulated that if there is a “compelling”
governmental interest in prohibiting a certain type of behavior or speech
for children in school, then it is reasonable and acceptable for schools to
prohibit that speech or conduct. Bullying surely fits into a category of
speech or conduct that the government has a strong interest in
regulating.83 Second, Morse broadened the classification of on-campus
speech. Although the Court did not specify exclusively what is and is not
considered on-campus regulation, it did say that a school-sanctioned
event that takes place during school hours fits within this category. Thus,
the language of Morse gives further justification and direction for antibullying legislation on campus. At the same time, however, it—like the
other Supreme Court cases in this area—fails to give any specific
direction for off-campus regulation.
E. Vagueness and Overbreadth
One enduring rule in Supreme Court jurisprudence is the requirement
that legislation be appropriately tailored (not overbroad), and sufficiently
clear (not vague). In light of this, it is ironic that the holdings in these
four cases provide language that, when adopted by legislators, inspires

80. Id. at 407 (quoting Veronica, 515 U.S. at 661) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 395 (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969))
82. Id. at 400–01.
83. See Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2010, S. 3739, 111th Cong. (2010).
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state legislation that is both overbroad and vague.84 Lower courts are
also left to their own discretion in determining what the language from
these cases means. The discretionary nature of the language has created a
large discrepancy among courts as to what constitutes permissible speech
regulation and what does not. In addition, the large majority of state
legislators have relied on these cases to create student-rights legislation,
specifically anti-bullying legislation. As would be expected, these states
use the Supreme Court’s exact language—language which has not been
defined or qualified—thereby creating the potential for constitutional
problems under the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. Although,
admittedly, state legislators must engage in some degree of guesswork
because the Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on off-campus
bullying, nor more specifically on cyberbullying, the language from
these four cases is still too overbroad and vague because it does not
provide specific parameters for states to accurately use the Court’s
rulings.
The definitions of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines are fairly
straightforward; but it is helpful to articulate the doctrines before
continuing with this analysis. In United States v. Williams, the Supreme
Court stated that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it chills “a
substantial amount of protected speech” relative to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.85 Also, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Court held
that a statute may be impermissibly vague for two independent reasons.
First, if the statute does not give a “person of ordinary intelligence” a fair
notice of what is prohibited, and second, if the statute does not “provide
explicit standards” for those who apply the law to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.86
The language from Tinker, which has been adopted in a great
majority of state cyberbullying statutes,87 presents the biggest

84. See Hayward, supra note 4, at 92 (stating that cyberbullying statutes are often so vague
that they offer no guidance to distinguish permissible from impermissible speech: “[T]hese laws do
not simply ‘chill’ student free speech, they plunge it into deep freeze.”); see also Goldman, supra
note 45, at 405 (explaining that most lower courts have applied the “substantial disruption” standard
to off-campus speech and find such speech unprotected when it reasonably may cause substantial
disruption at the school, though most lower courts still fail to identify how a court should determine
whether there is a “substantial disruption”).
85. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008).
86. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
87. For example, see ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to -9 (2010); ALASKA STAT. 14 §§ 33.200 to
.250 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2010); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 32260, 48900.4 (West 2010);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-F:2 to -F:10 (2010); N.D.
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overbreadth and vagueness problems with its oft-quoted “substantial
disruption” phrase. This is because the Court fails to define the phrase or
give any guidance toward its use. Although the standard is not as
substantially overbroad in an on-campus setting, and although the Court
did not necessarily intend the standard to be used in off-campus
situations, many laws have adopted the language and used it to
encompass any bullying which occurs on or off campus—effectively
regulating speech and expression that is First-Amendment protected.
Furthermore, the standard proves extremely vague when subjected to the
Grayned test: no person of ordinary intelligence would have fair notice
of what constitutes “substantial disruption,” and as was articulated in
Tinker, the standard fails to provide any sub-standards to direct law
enforcement officials on how to apply the law. Thus, the “substantial
disruption” test as it stands today covers far too much protected speech
and expression. Consider, for example, the following scenarios where
prohibiting language causing substantial disruption could seriously
inhibit free speech:
A letter to the editor of the New York Times criticizing a school’s
choice of curriculum can create a substantial disturbance on campus.
Such a letter may result in a flood of calls to administrators or even
make adoption of the school’s curriculum choice impossible. Similarly,
the “substantial disruption” test could allow the government to punish
students for watching popular television shows or reading particular
magazines, newspaper articles, or books for fear that discussion at
school of such normally protected speech will disrupt classes or
interfere with the fundamental values that the school seeks to teach.88

Therefore, for on-campus speech and especially for off-campus
speech, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard must be qualified to
avoid laws which will surely be facially void for vagueness and
overbreadth.
Although the three other Supreme Court cases—Fraser, Hazelwood,
and Morse—articulate different rules, they still rely on the Tinker
decision and thus still fail to describe the meaning of the phrase
“substantial disruption” themselves. However, for the most part, the rules
from these cases have the same likelihood to produce legislation that is

CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-17 to -22 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 (2010); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §
13-1303.1-A (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014 to -19 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.300.285 (2010).
88. Goldman, supra note 45, at 408.

1053

NASH.PAA

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/8/2013 2:42 PM

2012

on its face vague and overbroad. Constitutional problems arise when
state statutes extend those case rulings to off-campus cases because they
have no other rulings on which to rely. Overall, the problem in the realm
of student speech cases is the lack of clarity. Without much clarity in
these cases, lower courts and legislators are forced to use their own
discretion to apply case rulings to varieties of situations.
Within the bullying context, statistics show that bullying in schools
must be prohibited and that school anti-bullying laws must target offcampus cyberbullying in some way or another; but these laws must still
be written in a clear and concise way. Clear rules provide “predictability
and reduce the need for litigation. . . . [Moreover,] the value of clarity in
this area is particularly acute. Unclear rules risk chilling speech.”89
Although bullying is a problem that must be addressed, the Court and
state legislators must consider how to delicately balance that concern
with students’ First Amendment rights.
IV. STATES TO THE RESCUE: AN OVERVIEW OF ANTI-BULLYING
LEGISLATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
In response to recent events and the growing societal concerns of
bullying in our education system, forty-eight states90 have enacted antibullying laws.91 However, the breadth and depth of these statutes vary

89. Id. at 407.
90. The two states without anti-bullying legislation are Montana and South Dakota. See
supra note 5.
91. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to -9 (2010); ALASKA STAT. 14 §§ 33.200 to .250 (2010);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(37) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2010); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 32260, 48900.4 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10222d (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2010); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2010); GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2010); HAW. S.B. NO. 2094 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2010); 105
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27-23.7 (2010); IND. CODE §§ 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (2010); IOWA CODE
§ 280.28 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080(l)(C) (West
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20A, § 1001(15)(H) (2010);
MD. CODE ANN. EDUC. §§ 7-424 to -424.3 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2010);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1310b (2010); MINN. STAT. § 121A.0695 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
37-11-67 to -69 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267 (2010); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 388.135 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-F:2 to -F:10 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18A:37-15 to -21 (West 2010); 2010 N.J. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 122 (West); N.M. ADMIN. CODE §
6.12.7 (2010); N.Y. EDUCATION LAW §§ 10, 2801 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C407.15 to 407.18 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-17 to -22 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3313.666 to .667 (West 2010); OKLA. ST. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356
(2010); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34 (2010); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-63-140 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014 to -19 (2010); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§§ 25.0342, 37.001 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-101 to -401 (West 2010); VT.
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quite significantly from state to state, as would be expected. Although it
is unnecessary for this Comment to substantially examine each state’s
statute, a categorical analysis that surveys the statutes more collectively
is appropriate and helpful for further discussion and analysis of effective
statutory regulation. To discuss the different statutes, this Comment
groups the several states’ regulations into a gradient scale of three
categories—light, medium, and harsh—depending on the amount and
type of restrictions in the statutes.92 Because certain states have a
combination of elements from two or more distinct categories, this
categorization of states is somewhat generalized and fluctuant, and may
not include every state. However, for the purposes of this Comment,
these broad generalizations aid in an analysis of the trends in state
statutes.
A. Light Regulations: Not Light Problems
In the first category, which is composed of statutes with regulations
that are too light, the statutes are much too sparse to effectively define
the type of speech they regulate. As a result, these laws could cause
serious constitutional issues.93 The states in this category have created
anti-bullying laws, and some have even included electronic
communication in those laws; but overall, the laws fall very short of
either comprehensively defining bullying or providing schools with
effective solutions to regulate the bullying problem. Thus, the statutes in
this category are ineffective because they fail to provide a clear
description of bullying, and, more importantly, fail to articulate when
and where bullying can be regulated. Another concern with this
category’s sparse restrictions is the absence of any anti-bullying training
programs. Many statutes require school-wide training policies, but most
fail to require educational training programs94 for teachers or students,

STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 565 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.300.285 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-1 to -5 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2010);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-311 to -314 (2010). See also supra note 5 (giving an overview of which
states have anti-bullying laws, which states have included cyberbullying, electronic harassment,
criminal sanctions, or school sanctions in their laws, and which states require additional school
policies).
93. This light category includes Florida, Iowa, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See supra note 91.
94. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (2010) (failing to include a training program
requirement, an indication of when and where bullying can be regulated, and a regulation of
electronic communication or cyberbullying); N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 6.12.7 (2010); TEX. EDUC. CODE
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which would ensure that schools take an active and preemptive stance
against bullying.
Virginia’s anti-bullying statute, for example, requires each school
board to “include in its code of student conduct, prohibitions against
bullying, hazing, and profane or obscene language or conduct.” Instead
of providing definitions of “bullying,” “hazing,” etc., or clarifying any
other details of the required prohibitions, the statute leaves each Virginia
school district to its own judgment. The statute does not explain how
harsh to make school prohibitions, nor does it mention how far the
prohibitions can extend.95 Thus, without any language to determine the
boundaries of when and where to regulate, school districts are left to
their own discretion to determine when they can and cannot regulate
bullying. This grant of discretion is problematic on two extremes: school
officials may not know when they can regulate, thereby choosing either
not to regulate at all, or choosing to regulate anything within the
definition of bullying, regardless of when and where it takes place—very
easily unconstitutionally regulating the First Amendment rights of
students based on the vagueness and over-breadth doctrines.96
B. Medium Regulations: Almost Just Right
The second category of statutes, the medium group, comprises the
vast majority of states’ statutes. These statutes have language that, for the
most part, addresses most of the bullying concerns and also provides
students constitutional First Amendment protection. As a general rule,
these statutes require school districts to implement anti-bullying policies
and relevant training programs for both students and teachers. However,
what makes these statutes significantly more successful in targeting the
bullying problem within acceptable First Amendment limits than those in
the light category is the definition of exactly where and when schools can
regulate bullying.

ANN. § 37.001 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-1 to -5
(2010) (encouraging, but not requiring the implementation of a bullying task force).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2010); see also WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2010) (failing to
give any directions to school districts of how to design an anti-bullying statute and what to include in
such a statute).
96. See Noonan, supra note 19, at 332 (“The majority of cyberbullying legislation gives
schools wide discretion in determining when, if at all, administrators can intervene. The methods
that each state uses to deal with cyberbullying, coupled with the wide discretion given to schools to
handle the problem, leave many children free to cyberbully and their victims unable to escape.”).
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1. The “true medium” group
This category of statutes can be divided further into two
subcategories. The first group, labeled the “true medium” group for the
purposes of this Comment, does not mention cyberbullying or electronic
communication regulations at all, and includes no language that
expressly allows the regulation of off-campus speech.97 Therefore, this
group of statutes provides students the most First Amendment protection
of any other category because students’ off-campus speech and
expression cannot be regulated at all. However, these statutes are weak in
regulating bullying because they fail to even acknowledge the growing
problem of cyberbullying, which, as noted earlier, occurs almost
exclusively off campus. Thus, although these statutes do not mention any
off-campus regulations, it is inevitable that the school districts in these
states will encounter off-campus bullying and will be unable to act. It can
be argued, however, that in a few of these statutes there may be an
implied ability to regulate off-campus bullying. This implied right stems
from the “substantial disruption” language adopted from Tinker.
However, the few statutes that do include this “substantial disruption”
language are still weak, because they fail, as did the Supreme Court, to
define what constitutes a “substantial disruption.”
Tennessee’s anti-bullying law, for example, confines the regulation
of bullying solely to on-campus acts. In its statute, it says that
harassment, intimidation, or bullying means “any act that substantially
interferes with a student’s educational benefits, opportunities or
performance, that takes place on or immediately adjacent to school
grounds, at any school-sponsored activity, on school-provided
transportation, or at any official school bus stop.”98 Here, Tennessee
uses the “substantial” language, but uses it to qualify only on-campus
speech. While this approach does effectively protect students’ First
Amendment rights off campus, it seems to avoid the concerning
complexity of the cyber-world. Similarly, Indiana’s statute provides
details which confine regulations to
school grounds immediately before or during school hours,
immediately after school hours, or at any other time when the school is
being used by a school group; off school grounds at a school activity,

97. This true medium group includes Alaska, Wyoming, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Dakota, Ohio, and Tennessee. See supra note 91.
98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1015 (2010) (emphasis added).
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function, or event; traveling to or from school or a school activity,
function, or event; or using property or equipment provided by the
school.99

Yet, even this law could be more effective by mentioning home
electronic equipment and the regulation of cyberbullying. Consequently,
because the statutes in this category do not give any clear directions
regarding regulating off-campus bullying or interpreting behavior that
“substantially disrupts” school functions, school districts are left without
the tools to effectively solve the bullying problem—especially off
campus—and are forced to take their own discretionary measures.
2. The “medium plus” group
The second subcategory in this group, or the “medium plus” group
for purposes of this section, includes the regulation of cyberbullying or
electronic communication.100 Like the “true medium” group, however,
these statutes do not expressly allow the regulation of off-campus speech
in their descriptions of where bullying can be regulated.101 Although this
group technically provides less First Amendment protection than does
the true medium group (because the statutes regulate cyberbullying and
electronic communication), these statutes are more comprehensive and
therefore more effectively alleviate the complexity of the multi-realm
bullying problem.
Although each statute in this medium plus group has slightly
different characteristics and nuances, as a general rule, these statutes
should be considered model anti-bullying statutes for the states. This is
because these statutes do not expressly allow any off-campus regulation,
but do recognize and mention electronic communication and
cyberbullying in their laws. To reconcile this obvious discrepancy
between recognizing cyberbullying in their laws, but not expressly
allowing off-campus regulation, these statutes either allow the regulation
of cyberbullying only on-campus, or allow the regulation of
cyberbullying on or off campus if the conduct is “substantially disruptive

99. IND. CODE § 20-33-8-13.5 (2010).
100. Although there are only a few states that mention “cyberbullying” in their laws, see supra
note 5, the vast majority of the states’ statutes encompass cyberbullying through synonymous terms.
101. This medium-plus group includes Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming. Supra note
91.
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to schools.” Furthermore, the best statutes in this group solve the
problems of vagueness and overbreadth by explaining what “substantial
disruption” actually means102—limiting its applications, and thereby
eliminating the constitutional problems that have clouded the “substantial
disruption” standard for years. Because these laws are organized to
specifically allow only on-campus regulation and will make exceptions
to this rule only if the off-campus bullying substantially disturbs school
procedures, there is a presumption against regulating off-campus speech.
Thus, while this presumption clearly allows school districts to regulate
on-campus behavior, it also gives schools the tools they need to regulate
off-campus if such regulation is imperative—according to the articulated
criteria of “substantial disruption.”
For example, Arkansas’ statute includes electronic bullying,103 but
does not expressly allow off-campus regulation. This statute defines
bullying as conduct that physically harms a student, teacher, or property;
substantially interferes with a student’s education; creates a hostile
educational environment due to the severity, persistence, or
pervasiveness of the act; and substantially disrupts the orderly operation
of the school or educational environment.104 Here, Arkansas does not
expressly direct school districts to regulate off-campus speech, but
indirectly allows regulation if the conduct substantially interferes with a
student’s education. Also, Arkansas’ statute is more successful than
others in this category because it defines what “substantial disruption”
means:
“Substantial disruption” means without limitation that any one (1) or
more of the following occur as a result of the bullying:

102. For example, Alabama’s definition of harassment includes the “substantial disturbance”
language, and although it does not provide a definition as clear as Arkansas’ statute, it provides
parameters for the phrase by its specific definition and its context as part of a list: “To constitute
harassment, a pattern of behavior may do any of the following: (a) Place a student in reasonable fear
of harm to his or her person or damage to his or her property. (b) Have the effect of substantially
interfering with the educational performance, opportunities, or benefits of a student. (c) Have the
effect of substantially disrupting or interfering with the orderly operation of the school. (d) Have the
effect of creating a hostile environment in the school, on school property, on a school bus, or at a
school-sponsored function. (e) Have the effect of being sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive
enough to create an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for a student.”
ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-3(2) (2010).
103. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(3) (2010) (“‘Electronic act’ means without limitation a
communication or image transmitted by means of an electronic device, including without limitation
a telephone, wireless phone or other wireless communications device, computer, or pager.”).
104. Id. § 6-18-514(2).
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(A) Necessary cessation of instruction or educational activities;
(B) Inability of students of educational staff to focus on learning or
function as an educational unit because of a hostile environment;
(C) Severe or repetitive disciplinary measures are needed in the
classroom or during educational activities; or
(D) Exhibition of other behaviors by students or educational staff that
substantially interfere with the learning environment.105

Like the other statutes in this category, Arkansas’ statute has a
presumption against regulating off-campus speech. However, it
recognizes the need for some off-campus regulation in extreme
circumstances and successfully defines a clear and easy-to-follow
criterion for school districts. Therefore, these medium plus statutes are
ideal because school districts can regulate only on-campus bullying, but
have the tools necessary to solve off-campus problems should they arise.
Additionally, schools are no longer left to their own discretion to decide
when they can regulate off-campus speech.
C. Harsh Regulations: States Have Gone Too Far
The final category of regulations, those in the harsh category,
comprises the fewest statutes, but has the most extreme and pervasive
regulations.106 These statutes are similar to those in the medium group
because most include the “substantial disruption” language and require
school districts to implement anti-bullying training programs. But these
statutes give students the least First Amendment protection because the
statutes expressly direct school districts to regulate off-campus bullying.
By contrast, the medium category of statutes maintains a presumption
against off-campus regulation; here, the statutes favor regulating offcampus speech, which arguably violates the First Amendment.
For example, in addition to regulating on-campus behavior,
Massachusetts’ statute prohibits bullying at “location[s], activit[ies],
function[s] or program[s] that [are] not school-related, or through the use
of technology or an electronic device that [are] not owned, leased or used
by a school district or school.”107 Although Massachusetts qualifies this

105. Id. § 6-18-514(5). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2010) (failing to define
“substantially disrupt”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2010).
106. This harsh group includes Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
Supra note 91.
107. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (b) (2010) (emphasis added).
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regulation by suggesting that the off-campus conduct must “[create] a
hostile environment at school for the victim, [infringe] on the rights of
the victim at school or materially and substantially [disrupt] the
education process or the orderly operation of a school,”108 the language
of the statute has already created an unconstitutional presumption by
specifically directing school officials to regulate off campus in the first
place. Instead of keeping bullying regulation on campus and extending
off campus only in attenuating circumstances—as does the medium
category of statutes, this statute starts by regulating off campus and limits
the school’s ability to regulate only if the conduct does not meet a certain
criteria. Therefore, the statute is too harsh because schools can use their
discretion to presume they can regulate off campus First-Amendment
protected speech.109
Finally, it is appropriate to consider New Jersey’s statute last. Just as
many critics have stated, New Jersey’s anti-bullying statute is indeed one
of the toughest anti-bullying statutes, and accordingly falls within this
harsh category.110 In its definition of “harassment, intimidation, or
bullying,” New Jersey’s statute includes acts which take place “on school
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school
grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.2010 . . . that substantially
disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights
of other students . . . .”111 Although New Jersey’s statute, like
Massachusetts’, also has language that qualifies the school’s ability to
regulate off-campus bullying, this language is not readily apparent. The
major qualifications of the off-campus regulation can be found in section
16 of P.L.2010. This section, however, is nearly impossible to find, and
other than the qualifications found in that hidden section, the statute
contains no other limitations on how far school’s can regulate offcampus speech. The New Jersey statute, like many statutes in both the
medium and harsh categories, includes the “substantial disruption”
language; but it fails to define how to determine when conduct becomes
substantially disruptive. Consequently, the language in New Jersey’s
statute is on its face overbroad because it extends into the realm of
constitutionally protected off-campus student speech, and does not

108. Id.
109. See also Bennett, supra note 15 (“[I]n Massachusetts, which has one of the strictest [antibullying laws], anti-bullying programs are mandated in schools, and criminal punishment is outlined
in the text for even the youngest offenders.”).
110. See supra note 5.
111. 2010 N.J. SESS. LAW SERV. ch. 122 (West).
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provide any language, which limits the regulation’s scope.
V. THE BIG FIX: HOW NEW JERSEY AND OTHER STATES CAN TAILOR
THEIR LAWS
In considering the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law in
conjunction with existing anti-bullying statutes, the question remains
how to reconcile the two: what is the delicate balance between protecting
students’ free speech rights and sufficiently regulating bullying in and
out of schools? While the solution must come, to some extent, from
legislation, the reality is that legislation cannot and should not be the
complete answer. Instead the states should take an ex-ante approach and
focus on education. Such an approach would not only avoid the
constitutional ramifications that result from over-legislation, but would
also take a preventative approach and eliminate bullying from the
beginning instead of trying to solve the problems ex-post.
A. Education Not Legislation
Although students surely know about bullying, many are most likely
unaware of its many different forms and the drastic ramifications it may
have. Bullying is a serious issue, but the best way to eliminate the
problem is through anti-bullying education, not legislation. Bullying and
cyberbullying education is especially relevant to the concerns of this
Comment because education eliminates the need to over-regulate in the
realm of off-campus First Amendment protected speech, and additionally
provides a more effective solution to the problems associated with
bullying.
Scholars have already shown the effectiveness of education in
solving bullying-related issues. For example, Patricia W. Agatston,
Robin Kowalski, and Susan Limber conducted research on students’
perspectives and responses to bullying, and their findings suggest that
preventative messages targeting students, educators, and parents is the
best way to fight against this seemingly unending battle.112 Surprisingly,
this research revealed that students viewed bullying, specifically
cyberbullying, as a problem, “but one rarely discussed at school,” and
that students did not view “school district personnel as helpful resources”
when combating the bullying challenges they faced.113 Although several
112. Patricia W. Agatston, Robin Kawalski & Susan Limber, Students’ Perspectives on Cyber
Bullying, J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH S59, S59 (2007).
113. Id.
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state statutes have required schools to adopt an already established antibullying policy or create their own, the emphasis on these programs has
not been strong enough and schools need to take an even more increased
role in educating about bullying.114 “If we can change this culture in K12, hopefully we won’t have incidents by the time [students] are in
college or in the workplace . . . that is what education is about, to teach
our kids courtesy and respect as well.”115
Yet another, equally compelling reason to focus on education and not
legislation is the fact that making bullying or cyberbullying a crime “is a
scare tactic that has proven to be ineffective,”116 and could actually have
devastating results on students found guilty of cyberbullying. Most
research and statistics fail to consider the negative consequences that
stem from labeling students as bullies, whether or not those students
were actually in the wrong. Although students must learn to take
responsibility for their actions, labeling them as bullies, or even as
criminals in the most extreme cases, “can have lasting effects not only on
how they will later be able to fit into social order and re-establish
themselves in the community, but also on their future educational
endeavors.”117 Focusing more on educational programs will shift
schools’ attention to informing students about bullying and its
consequences, rather than pointing fingers and assessing blame, and will
therefore ultimately protect more students by creating safer, more
constructive school environments.118
As would be expected, an educational approach to the overall
bullying problem is also a necessary step in reducing the cyberbullying

114. It is important to note, that there are many states, including New Jersey, which do have
extremely stringent anti-bullying training and education programs; however, for the most part, these
states have also over-legislated in an unacceptable way. The important thing for states to do is to find
the balance between education and legislation.
115. Monsy Alvarado, Halting Bullies is New Priority, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Sept. 5, 2011),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/129283053_Halting_bullies_is_new_priority. html (quoting Frank
Belluscio of the New Jersey School Boards Association, explaining what New Jersey’s new
legislation aims to accomplish) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Noonan, supra note 19, at 358.
117. Id. See also Bennett, supra note 15 (explaining that the “bullies” responsible for Tyler
Clementi’s death face up to five years in prison, with potentially more charges, and asking where is
the line between behavior that is bad and behavior that is criminal).
118. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 1–2 (describing how those charged with bullying Phoebe Prince
have suffered as a result of their charges: “The charges turned the six students into international
symbols of callow teenage evil. . . . They were kicked out of school. Sean lost a football scholarship
to college. They are all facing pretrial proceedings in September, with the possibility of prison time
if they’re convicted.”).
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problem that has become rampant in schools over the past decade.
Although they are experts with various technological devices, from cell
phones to Facebook, students—especially those who are younger—are
unaware of the “social and moral ramifications”119 that can result from
these devices. So much harm can occur simply by clicking a mouse or
sending a text, and students need to be aware of these potential
consequences. Specifically, schools should encourage the safe and
considerate use of computers and other equipment by educating their
staff and students about the do’s and don’ts of online and computer
communication, and encouraging parents to go online with their children
and monitor their activities.120
Although schools seem to be the most obvious arena to target the
bullying problem, one important consideration is to educate communitywide, by getting parents and community members involved in the antibullying education process. Richard Bozza, the executive director of the
New Jersey Association of School Administrators, critiqued New
Jersey’s law by explaining that bullying “is not a school issue,” but is a
“community issue” that should be addressed as a community.121 Indeed,
schools that are successful in combating the bullying problem share
several features: “strong leadership, clearly articulated and enumerated
anti-discrimination policies, a commitment to training for all parts of the
community, consistent reinforcement of positive school culture and
nimble systems of communication.”122 Thus, critical to these stable,
successful schools is both a specific anti-bullying policy—which is
where legislation is necessary—and the involvement of school and
community leaders. Once students, their parents, and community
members become aware of the bullying problem and the steps they can
take to avoid and address the problems, bullying will finally become a
solvable problem. Instead of attempting to legislate bullying and
cyberbullying “out of existence (a quixotic dream),” schools and
legislatures should choose a “more productive approach . . . that is
proactive and educational.”123

119. Hayward, supra note 4, at 90.
120. Id. at 89 n.12.
121. Alvarado, supra note 115.
122. Joel Baum, Gender, Safety and Schools: Taking the Road Less Traveled, 15 U.C. DAVIS
J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 167, 170 (2011).
123. Hayward, supra note 4, at 89–90 (providing a list of nine proposals to prevent
cyberbullying from recurring: (1) not engaging the person by replying; (2) printing all online
communications so that cyberbullying is documented; (3) changing screen names and sharing them
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B. How Tailored Legislation Can Help

Although education is the most effective way to solve the bullying
problem, schools may still need some prodding and funding from
legislation to actually get results. However, aside from establishing clear
and specific anti-bullying policies, legislation should be viewed more as
a safety valve, if and when problems occur, rather than the actual
solution to bullying. The problem with current legislation is that it has
become increasingly harsh, prohibiting—and at times—criminalizing
more speech and expression, and ultimately creating even more
problems.124 Therefore, instead of eliminating anti-bullying legislation
altogether—which would surely wreak political havoc—and relying
solely on educational measures, the most efficient and logical solution is
to tailor existing legislation so that it works in conjunction with
educational programs.
When considering how to appropriately tailor legislation so as not to
legislate past constitutional boundaries, we must look closely at what
states are already doing successfully to determine what we really need to
change. As established in the statutory analysis in Part IV, most states
already require school districts to adopt an anti-bullying policy and
several require schools to also train students, teachers, and staff about
bullying.125 However, few statutes specify what such policies and
training programs ought to include. In addition, only a few states have
programs that take specific measures to hold schools responsible for their
progress in these training programs. Consequently, in order to maintain
unity among state school districts and to ensure that schools are actually
implementing the policies and training articulated in the statutes,
with selected friends and family only; (4) not sharing personal information in chat rooms; (5)
contacting service providers to identify where negative emails originate; (6) thinking before sending
a reply; (7) increasing parental awareness of online tools, applications, games, and other online
materials used by their children; (8) involving teachers of children that are being cyber bullied; and
(9) initiating comprehensive action by teachers, other school staff, students, parents, and community
members).
124. See id. at 90.
125. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.200 to .250 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(37)
(2010); ARK. CODE ANN. 6-18-514 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2010); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 10-222d (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2010); IOWA CODE § 280.28; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72-8256(c) (2010) (requiring only that “such plan shall include provisions for the training
and education for staff members and students,” but giving no specifics regarding that plan); MO.
REV. STAT. § 160.775(4) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15 to -407.18 (2010); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3313.666 to .667 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-63-140 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-101 to -401 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, §§ 11, 565 (2010); WASH REV. CODE § 28A.300.285 (2010).
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legislation must include detailed and specific requirements for school
districts’ policies; provide school districts with standardized training,
materials for such training, or at least specific instructions to direct
school districts in creating their own training; and require school districts
to report back and remain accountable for their progress.
Equally important to tailoring statutes to include educational
policies, training, and accountability to current legislation, is tailoring
statutes to avoid over-legislation—especially to resolve the First
Amendment issues many statutes pose. As articulated in Part IV, each
state takes a slightly different approach to anti-bullying legislation, but as
a general rule, those statutes in the medium category share characteristics
that are most ideal for anti-bullying legislation nationwide. Following the
characteristics in the medium category, states have two options: (1)
choose to regulate only on campus and find other ways to take care of
off-campus bullying and cyberbullying; or (2) choose to regulate
primarily on campus, but allow regulation off campus only if absolutely
necessary, only if a certain, clearly articulated criterion is satisfied.
Several scholars have argued that perhaps the first option is best
because it offers full protection to students’ off-campus First
Amendment rights by not allowing any off-campus regulation. One
benefit to this type of statute is that it strengthens and validates schools’
on-campus regulations:
Treating speech outside of school supervision as deserving of full First
Amendment protection has the advantage of making restrictions on
speech under school supervision more like a time, place, and manner
regulation. By leaving other channels for student speech open, greater
restrictions on student speech can be justified where they are truly
needed.126

By excluding any off-campus regulation, schools do not face the
vagueness and overbreadth problems that come from other unclear
statutes; but at the same time, these schools are confronted with the
inability to provide necessary protection to students who are victims to
off-campus bullying and cyberbullying. Many states and scholars have
presented viable options to resolve this problem.
For example, North Carolina’s statute does not allow schools to
regulate any bullying or cyberbullying off campus; but it has established
a cyberbullying law that is completely separate from school

126. Goldman, supra note 45, at 408.
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legislation.127 Here, although schools in North Carolina can regulate only
on campus, thereby maintaining students’ First Amendment rights, the
state legislature has established additional legislation outside the school
sphere to target the growing problem of off-campus cyberbullying. These
additional off-campus regulations could be justified under the First
Amendment through the “fighting words” or “true threat” doctrines and
would not only keep school regulations within the school sphere, but
would also provide a community-wide solution to the bullying problem.
Because the fighting words doctrine requires that speech has the
likelihood to provoke an immediate violent reaction, it is, to say the least,
difficult to analogize to bullying.128 The true threat doctrine is more
helpful. Under this doctrine, true threats, which are statements that
communicate to a reasonable person a serious intent to cause a present or
future harm,129 are entirely unprotected by the First Amendment.130
Therefore, such a doctrine could provide relief to some bullying victims
who cannot turn to schools for relief because of statutory prohibitions.
But despite these out-of-school alternatives to regulating off-campus
bullying, the second option—which instructs schools to regulate
primarily on campus, but allows regulation off campus if a certain,
clearly articulated criterion is satisfied—seems to be the most effective
and the most accepted solution for tailoring anti-bullying legislation.
This approach seems more effective than the first because many states
already use it in some form, and this approach would require less
tailoring to resolve the First Amendment problems that accompany much
anti-bullying legislation.
If state legislatures choose to tailor their anti-bullying legislation
according to this second approach, they must clearly define where and
when regulation of on-campus bullying can take place, and they must

127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2009).
128. Cohen, supra note 11. See also Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMS,
and E-mails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J.
ART TECH. & INTEL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (2011). But see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1941) (holding that the state can restrict words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace, which arguably could include bullying or cyberbullying).
129. Goldman, supra note 45, at 410 (explaining that the speaker need not actually intend to
carry out the threat, but rather the doctrine is intended to protect individuals from the fear of violence
and from the disruption that fear engenders); see also U.S. v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 524 (4th Cir.
2012) (The “true threat” doctrine requires “proof of a specific intent to threaten,” but not proof of
“intent to carry out the threat.”).
130. Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials
and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 599 (2011).
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clearly articulate Tinker’s “substantial disturbance” doctrine to establish
a threshold for how and when schools can regulate off-campus bullying
and cyberbullying.131 “State-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism” and officials do not and should not have “absolute
authority over their students”;132 therefore, it is imperative that antibullying legislation establishes clear parameters for school regulation.
The majority of states with statutes in the medium category already
include language that clearly, and satisfactorily, defines their on-campus
boundaries: on school grounds, in school vehicles, at designated school
bus stops, at school-sponsored activities or events, etc. But only a few
have defined the parameters of off-campus speech beyond a mere
mention of the substantial-disturbance doctrine.133 Therefore, states must
tailor their legislation to define what this doctrine means and how it can
be applied. Only then will states be able to address both on- and offcampus bullying concerns while, at the same time, eliminating the
vagueness and overbreadth problems that currently exist in the majority
of anti-bullying statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bullying in schools is a difficult problem that calls for immediate
attention. But because of its natural implications on the First Amendment
rights of students, solving the problem requires a very delicate balance
from schools and legislators nationwide.
So, is New Jersey’s harsh, new anti-bullying statute a model statute
for the states? Not quite. Although critics of the statute worry that it
imposes too many responsibilities—which include inherent costs—on
teachers and the community, the statute is actually successful in
providing a strong focus on anti-bullying education. In this particular
aspect of the statute, the increased regulation is actually a positive
change. But New Jersey’s legislation is not successful in other key
aspects, namely its direct off-campus legislation, which infringes on
students’ First Amendment rights not only because it extends beyond the
school grounds, but also because it does so according to schools
officials’ discretion. As the Supreme Court states in our leading case,
Tinker:

131. See Noonan, supra note 19, at 34.
132. Waldman, supra note 130, at 592.
133. See supra note 90.
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‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools.’ The classroom is
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discover truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection.’134

Because the First Amendment rights of students are vital rights,
statutes, especially New Jersey’s, must be tailored to eliminate the
vagueness and overbreadth problems. Fortunately, even though most
states’ legislation have First Amendment complications at present, these
states need only tailor a small part of their laws to make them First
Amendment approved. Once states tailor their statutes and decide to take
a more preventative approach, students across the United States will have
two of their freedoms restored: safety from bullies and freedom of
speech.
Lindsay Nash*

134. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (citation omitted).
* JD candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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